The Act on the Reform of the Market for Medical Products (ArzneimittelmarktNeuordnungsgesetz -AMNOG) of 22 December 2010 put an end to free pricing for new drugs in Germany. (1) The Act requires that new products are subjected to an early evaluation of their additional benefit by the Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss -G-BA) after being launched on the market:
•
If it is not possible to prove any additional benefit versus the comparative therapy previously identified by the Committee (existing standard therapy), the pharmaceutical is allocated to a reference price group with comparable active ingredients. If there is no such reference price group, the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds (GKV-Spitzenverband -GKV-SV) negotiates with the pharmaceutical company on a refund rate which does not lead to higher annual therapy costs than the expedient comparative therapy.
• If an additional benefit is proven to exist, the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds negotiates with the pharmaceutical company a supplement on top of the price of the expedient comparative therapy.
While the AMNOG procedure is being completed, the price set by the pharmaceutical company itself applies to the new pharmaceutical, but only for one year.
International Reference Pricing (IRP) is a key cost-containment tool for health care payers across the world. IRP may apply either fixed or flexible rules to calculate the price of branded drugs. Typically there is no negotiation between manufacturers and the IPR body. (2) OBJECTIVES: In the context of the German AMNOG price negotiations and the role of Germany as a key referenced country, there is dearth of real-life evidence on the international impact of the AMNOG Act. We carried out pricing simulations to assess the potential impact of new drug pricing in Germany as a result of the AMNOG Act on other countries that reference Germany either formally or informally. See Graph 1.
Graph 1: Countries referencing Germany for prices of branded drugs.

METHODS:
The publicly available IRP rules were screened and evaluated systematically. Based on these findings an IRP model was developed to simulate scenarios of price agreements for a new drug between the German Head Association of the Statutory Health Insurance Companies and the manufacturer. The impact of the price agreement on other countries was analysed based on the IRP tool "Orange". See Graph 2. 
RESULTS:
Currently Germany is being referenced by 21 countries worldwide: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Switzerland, and Taiwan. We simulated a hypothetical price dataset for a new branded drug X with all prices set at 100 euro to limit the impact to Germany only. We assumed the drug would be launched in all markets, including those referenced by the 21 countries listed above.
In the first simulation we assessed the impact of a 25% price drop in Germany.
The results suggest that such a reduction would lead to a range of 32.5% reduction in Egypt and almost 1% in Austria. The largest impact in Europe would be in France, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Luxembourg (-25%), followed by Norway and Greece (-8.33%), the Netherlands (-6.25%), Switzerland, Ireland and Denmark. See Graph 3.
Graph 3: Price reduction by 25% in Germany and impact on prices in other countries.
A price drop of 50% in Germany would double the impact in most countries. See Graph 4.
Graph 4: Price reduction by 50% in Germany and impact on prices in other countries.
Assuming that the new drug had solid evidence supporting a significant additional benefit that resulted in a 25% increase in the price in Germany, the simulation results demonstrated a limited impact. The model predicted a modest 6.25% increase in the Netherlands, 4.17% in Switzerland, 2.78% in Ireland and Denmark, and about 1% increase in Austria. However, since IRP rules are used by payers as a cost-containment tool, it is not clear whether such price increase would indeed be implemented.
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